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Summary  findings
Shafik  assesses  the Czechoslovak  mass  privatization  about enrerprise  values  into the public  domain bv
progtam for speed, equity, and corporate governance.  allowing  increasingly  infornmed  bidders  to interact.
The program  transferred  claims  on assets  in 1,491  The structure  of ownership  that emergeJ will have
enterprists - assets  worth about $10.7  billion  - to the  very  different  implications  for corporate governance.
8 5 million  citizens  who participated  in the scheme.  The  Enterprises  in the Czech  Republic,  and those that sold
entire cycle  of project  preparation,  public  information,  for high  prices in the bidding  rounds,  are chiaracterized
and nationwide  simultaneous  bidding  took 14 months.  by a greater concentration  of shareholdings.  T  hose in the
This was equivalent  to privatizing  more than three  Slovak  Republic,  and those that sold for lower  prices,
medium-scale  and large-scale  en:erprises,  on average,  per  have more  diffuse  ownership  structures.
day.  The mass  privatization  scheme  served  to quickly
Equity objectives  were achieved  by transferring  equal  differentiate  the enterprises  with favorable  prospects
claims  (equivalent  to about $1,250 per person) to all  from those with unfavorable  prospects  under current
participants  and by putting in place  a transparent  and  conditions.  But enterprises  that could have survived  in
decentra!ized  process.  The government's  role was simply  some form, if they had been restructured  before
to provide  a framework  and a set of rules for potential  privatization,  or enterprises  that could have  been viable
firms,  managers,  and shareholders  to find each other.  but lacked  effective  governance,  were sacrificed  for the
The schenie's  design  - based  on simultaneous  sake  of speed and decentralization.
sequential  bidding  rounds  - worked  to put information
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department  to monitor and evaluate  innovative  approaches  to the transition  from central  planning  to market  economies.
Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 2043.3.  Please  contact
Anita Correa, room HI 1-105,  extension  38549 (56 pages).  December  1993,
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development  issues.  An  objective  of the  series  is  toget the  findings  out quickly.  even  if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully  polished.  The
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I.  Intolctn
As in most  post-communist  societies,  the debate  about  structural  transformation  in
Czezhcslovakia  was essentially  between  'gradualists'  and 'radicals/bi;  bangers". 1 Gradualists
advocated  a slower  pace  of privatization  to allow  time  for the establishment  of the institutions  of a
market  economy,  to begin  restructuring  some  enterprises  and  to reduce  the adverse  consequences  for
labor. The "big  bangers saw ownership  transformation  as a necessary  part of tho establishment  of a
market  economy  and therefore  sought  to privatize  as quicldy  as possible. Unlike  countries  like
Poland  where  agriculture,  which  constituted  between  12-24%  of GDP  during  the 1980s,  was already
in private  hands,  Czechoslovakia  was  one of the most extreme  cases  of a cent  ly-planned  economy.
As recently  as 1989,  about  98% of all property  was in state  hands  and  less  than 1%  of net material
product  was generated  by the non-agricultural  private  sector. 2 There were  about  7000  medium  and
large  scale  enterprises  and 25,000-30,000  small  scale  enterprises  in the state  sector. Gradualism  was
also  not an option  for macroeconomic  reasons. Household  savings  rates  in Czechoslovakia  were  4%
during  the 1980s,  unlike  the over  20% household  savings  rates  in gradualist  reformers  like China.
Thus  there was little  scope  for the emerging  domestic  private  sector  to rapidly  outgrow  the state
sector.
In Czechoslovakia,  the radicals  won  the debate  and  the government's  strategy  placed
ownership  transformation  at the center  of its reform  effort. An important  element  of that strategy  was
the mass  privatizatin  scheme,  the first  of its kind  in all the transition  economies.  Czechoslovakia,  like
other formerly  centrally  planned  economies,  had been  characterized  by forced  savings  to finance
extremely  high investment  rates,  much  of which  was  poorly  allocated. Thus  the deferred-2  -
consumption  of citizens  was  translated  into  fixed  assets  owned  by the state. After  the Velvet
Revolution  in 1989,  the privatizatlon  process  was seen  as a mechanism  for compensating
Czechoslovak  citmzens  for their  sacrifices  under  the previous  regime. Privatization,  and  particularly
the coupon  scheme,  was also  seen as an instrument  for securing  ths political  irreversibility  of the
transformatlon  to a market  e.:onomy.
This  paper  is organized  as follows: Section  II analyzes  the economic  rationale  for the
coupon  scheme  and  puts it into  context. 'he  preparation  of enterprises  for privatization,  referred  to
as the 'supply  side' in Czechoslovakia,  is described  in Section  m, including  an analysis  of the
characweristics  of the enterprises  offered  through  the coupon  scheme  and the initial  distribution  of
shares  across  potential  owners. The evolution  of demand  for shares  - by citizens  and investment
funds --  through  the various  bidding  rounds  is assessed  in Section  IV.  The conclusions  in Section  V
evaluate  the coupon  scheme  in terms  of speed,  equity,  and  corporate  governance.
I.  'Me Coupon  Scheme  in Context
The dual  imperatives  of speed  and equity  are what  gave  birth  to the coupon  scheme.
The need  for rapid  ownership  transformation  argued  for a process  that involved  little  government  role
in the preparation  of enterprises  for privatization  and quick  sale,  even  at very low  prices  since
revenue  generation  was not  a priority,  to the highest  bidder. This would  also  rmirnimize  the time  in
which  enterprises  would  be in limbo  without  effective  owners. But  opening  the process  to all would
have meant  that  foreigners  would  have  easily  outbid  nationals,  whose  total  private  savings  amounted
to only about  Kcs  300  billion  in 1991,  which  was a fraction  of the book  value  of enterprises  to be
privatized. Moreover,  there was a danger  that  relatively  wealthy  citizens  would  benefit  more,
especially  since  60% of households  had savings  of less  than  Kcs 20,000  (between  $700-750).
Politically,  equal  public  participation  in the  process  was critical  for avoiding  the perception  that  only-3  -
the wealthy  and  well-connected  were  benefltting  from  the privatization  of enterprises  that were built
through  the efforts  of the entire  population.
The government  trafered  claims  on state  enterprise  assets  to  the public  which  they
could  use for the sole  purpose  of privatization.  The assets  to which  these  claims  would  be attached
would  be determined  through  a bidding  process. The size of the "subsidy"  to citizens  was  purely  a
function  of the number  of people  who  chose  to partlcipate  In the scheme. Tho more  people  wanting  a
portion  of the clairns  for a fixed  number  of enterprise,  the smaller  the subsidy  transferred  to each
individual.  Why create  such  an elaborate  scheme  to transfer  public  wealth  to private  citizens?  There
are a number  of possible  exp.anations.  The coupon  scheme  created  a level  playing  field  for all
citizens. Everyone  gets  the same  transfer  at the start  of the process  and  participation  is vo!'ntary.
Restricting  monetary  bids  to nationals  would  have  substantially  lowered  the sales  price at which
enterprises  were  privatized. This may  have  caused  negative  spillover  effects  on the sale  price of
enterprises  sold  through  direct  sales  to foreign  or domestic  buyers. The altemrtive  of allowing  only
citizens  to bid cash would  favor  the wealthy. In both  cases,  domestic  credit  market  imperfections
would  have  meant  that those  with  access  to international  capital  markets  would  have  been  in a far
better  position  to buy privatized  assets. Therefore,  it was necessary  to create  dual  markets  for
privatization  - one  that was  a true market  where  demand  was based  on real  purchasing  power  and
another  market  where  participation  was restricted  to citizens  who  were  given  purchasing  power  by the
state in the form  of coupons.
Pure  Ricardian  equivalence  would  imply  that  no real  transfer  resulted  from  the coupon
scheme  since  citizens  would  simply  pay higher  taxes  in the future  than  if these  enterprises  had been
sold using  more  conventional  privatization  methods. In a world  of perfect  markets,  this would  be
true. Nevertheless,  there is a real  transfer  where  privatization  will result  in productivity  gains,
thereby  increasing  the expected  value  of the asset  transferred  to citizens  today. Thus  the size of tLe4 -
potandal transfor is endogenoL's.  Moreover, a key factor was that the effective  transfer was very
i'ifferent  across citizens, depending  on their ability to use market information  (either directly or
indirectly through IPPA). This differentiation  of beneflts, depanding  on bidding sklll, was an essential
part oi. Introducing  the principles of a market economy.
Although  the coupon schome  has received  a great deal of attention  because of ilS
innovativeness,  it was actually  only a part of Czechoslovakia's  overall approach to cwnership
trasformation.  What emerged was a hybrid process that rdied on a variety of privatization  methods
including:  (1) transfer of state property to municipalities;  (2) restitution to original owners; (3)
trwformation  of cooperatives;  (4) small scale privatization  through public auctions'; and
(5) privatization  of medluta and large scale enterprises  through direct sale, joint ventures and the
coupon scheme. 4 The Czechoslovak  government  did not rely very much on temporary srlutions such
as leasing or contracting  out to the private sector, which do not necessarily  transform ownership,  but
can generate some efficienc gains in the interim.'  Because  the start of the voucher scheme required
that all projects be ready at the same time, the government  spent much  of its time in the initial period
processing projects for coupon  privatization. Therefore in early 1992, the coupon scheme accounted
for almost three quarters  of property undergoing  privatization. However, as other privatization
methods, such as direct sale, grow in importance,  the proportion  of total assets privatized through the
coupon system is likely to diminish. For example,  in the second wave, the coupon scheme is
expected to account for only about one-third of total book value privatized.
m.  The Supply Side: What was Sold?
A.  Project Preparation: Encouraging  Competition
A schematic  of the institutions  and steps associated with the coupon scheme is
provided in Figure 1.  The process or generating  privatization  proposals was driven by the desire tocreate competition  among  potential buyers.  Each enterprise selected  for privatization  had to submit
its own basic privatization  project reflecting  management's views about the firm's future. But
competing  proposals for large scale privatization  projects could be submitted by anyone to the
enterprise's 'founders'  or managing  authorities  (usually  sectoral ministries)  using a standard format.
Information on tt  r  ubmission of privatization  proposals was widely  disseminated  to encourage public
participation. No preference  was given to 'insiders,'  either managers  or employees.'  Of course
isiders  did have access  to privileged  information,  but officially  the process was open to Rli  and
'Insiders'  were subject to legal punishment  for not complying  with Informational  requests of those
submitting competing  proposals. 7 Ultimately,  the review of competing  projects that entered the
coupon scheme was somewhat  of a 'black box'  with no strict criteria governing  the selection  of the
propost  that was finally included in the mass privatization  scheme.
The government  did not attempt  to restructure enterprises  before privatization  - ths
would only slow down the process and would be too remLniscent  of the central planning  view that the
state knew better than the privatm  sector how production  should best be organized. Restructuring
proposals could be submitted  in the context  of privatization  proposals by interested  buyers, but were
not initiated by the govermment. The most frequent  type of restructuring  proposed and approved was
breaking up of large enterprises into smaller units.  This was approved  as long as the firm's overall
value was not reduced as a result of the splitting  of assets.  There was no real effort to restructure
firms financially,  to change management,  or to shed labor prior to privatization. There were two loan
consolidation  operations in 1991 and 1992, but these were intended  to address the banks' portfolio
problems, not the financial restructuring  needs of the enterprise sector.  The agency and control
problems that might result from diffuse ownership  were not a serious concern. The government also
did not emphasize  the revenue generation  aspect of privatization  - price was only used as the most
efficient mechanism  for distinguishing  the degree to which potential buyers valued the firm.-6-
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B.  Ihe Couron  Scheme: What  was on Offer?
The Center  for Coupon  Privatization  published  a list of 1491  companies  with  a book
value  of Kcs 300  billion  (about  $10.6  billion)  on May 13, 1992  which  would  be included  in the
coupon  scheme  (out  of a total  of 2744  enterprises  slated  for privatization  in the first wave). This
publication  included  the following  information  for each  enterprise:  name,  address,  business  activity,
identification  number,  shares  offered,  book  value,  value  of other  enterprise  assets,  debts,  output  in
1989-91,  book  profit  in 1989-91,  number  of employees  in 1989-91,  allocation  of non-coupon  shares
(foreign  investors,  domestic  investors,  restitution,  National  Property  Fund,  state, or sale of shares
through  some  third  party  such as a bank). Since  the government's  transformation  program,  including-7-
price and trwade  liberalization,  had begun  in 1990,  the data on entwrprist  performance  in 1950  and
1991  had some  relevance. Howaver,  the  publication  also included  a warning  that much  of the data
were of dubious  qtlity  and  may  not be relevant  in a rapidly  changing  economic  situation.
Of the  491  enterprices  included  in the first wave  of coupon  prlvatization,  943  with a
book value  of Kcs  206.4 billion  were from  tIe Czech  Republic,  487  enterprises  with a book  value  of
Kcs  90.1 billion  were from  the Slovak  Reriblic and 61 enterprises  with  a book  value of Kcs 2.9
billion  wete enterprises  operating  at the Federal  level. The ratio  of assets  offered  for voucher
prlva?'zatlon  across  Republics  was  2.29:  1, which  corresponded  to the ratio  of voucher  holders  in the
Czech  Republic  relative  to those  in the Slovak  Republic. Within  the group  of 1491  enterprises  in the
coupon  scheme,  some  shares  were  set aside  for foreign  ot domestic  investors,  restitution,  the National
Pronerty  Fund,  banks,  and  transfers  to municipalities  (able  1).
In both Republics
the  vast  majority  of shares were  Table  1:  Coupon  Scheme  Distribution  of Shares
available  for citizens  to bid  under  I
Foreign  Invesors  1.6%  0.8%
the coupon scheme. In Slovakia,  DomstInvestors  3.8%  2.3%
the proportion  of total shares  offered  Restiution  0.4%  0.02%
National  Property Fund (temporary)  7.0%  2.8%
to citizenS  was much higZher  at
National  Property Fund (permanent)  O1.%  2.0%
92.  1% compared  to that in the  Banks  1.5%  0%
Czech Republic. In both Republics,  | Municipalities  1.2%  0%
Ciizn  84.3%  92.1%
those  small proportions  of shares  8-
that were set a'4e for other  purposes  tended  to be concentrated  in a very small  number  of
enterprises.'C.  Creriatics  of Enterpss
Data on the eharacterigtics  of the enterprises  included in the first wave of coupon
privatization  are presented in Tables 2 and 3.1 Given the large number  of firms included in the
coupon scheme, it is not surprising that the sectoral composition  mirrored that of the entire
Czechoslovak  economy. The largest number of firts  were in the engineering  and building and civil
engineering  sectors - which aceounted  for 458 enterpries  or about one-third  of all enterprises in the
coupon scheme.  The food industry, with 148 enuerprises  was the next most common  sector.  In
general, firms included in the first wave were in productive sectors like manufacturing  and services
and not public utilities, whose privatizition raised complex  isWas of regulation  which were postponed
tc the second wave.  lhe  largest enterprises  in terms of book value tended to be !r b tinking,  electric
power, iron and steel, metallurgy, chemicals,  pulp and paper, clothing and insurance.
Based on the data on past performance  provided  to the public, the most profitable
sectors were the foreign trade companies,  banks and insurance  companies. The average profit/equity
ratio in 1991 for the entire sample was 17.6, while these sectors had ratios four to seven times that
level.  Thus it is nct surprising that foreign  trade, banking and insurance  would emerge as some of
the most popular shares in the bidding rounds. Factor shares, as reflected in capital/output  and
capital/labcr ratios, tended to vary as might be expected  across economic  activities. Sectors with high
ratios of capital tended to be water supply; glass, china and stoneware; foreign trade and banking.
Labor-intensive  sectors tended to be design, research and development,  clothing, security and
services.
One of the most striking  characteristics  of the enterprises is their relatively low
indebtedness, as evidenced  by the low average debt/equity  ratios. The most indebted firms tended to
be in the financial sectors (banking  and foreign trade), which is normal given the nature of these
activities. Thereafter, the firms providing  infrastructure  and services tended to have some of the-9  -
highest debt/equity ratios -- building and civil engineering,  engineering,  mining, communication,
domestic trade, retail sales, publishing,  and other services. These are sectors that may have been
forced to provide their output at subsidized  prices and as a consequence  incurred substantial  debts in
their operations. However, the average debt/equity  ratio for the entire sample is well below a
"normal" rate in most market economies  (of course the 'normal'  rate varies by the nature and
riskiness of the enterprise's activities). The explanation  for this may lie in the direct budgetary
s"bsidies that these enterprises  once received in the form of equity.  As loss making enterprises
increasing relied on banks, rather than the government  budget, for financial  support, these
enterprises' debt levels may have risen dramatically  since this data from 1991.
The sectoral distribution  of Czech and Slovak enterprises  was broadly similar as were
debt/equity ratios.  However, in terms of other characteristics,  there were some najor differences.
Czech enterprises  tended to have higher book values on average and tended to be more capital-
intensive in terms of book value (as evidenced  by the capital/output  and capital/labor  ratios).  Labor
productivity  was also higher on average in the Czech Republic. The major differencs was
profitabiity.  Profitability (as measured by profit/equity or profit/output)  was on average over twice
as high in the Czech Republic  than in Slovakia.- 10  -
Table  2
Sector  and Sik  of Entwprise Offered  in the Fit  Wave  (1991)
C S F R  CZECH  REPUBLIC  SLOVAK  REPUBLIC
Average  Book  Average  Book  Average  Book
Number  of  Value  Number  of  Value  Number  of  Value
Subsector  Enterpri  (MiUllon  Kca)  Enterpriea  (Million  Kcs)  Enterprie  (Milloan  Kca)
ASriculture  61  165.9  55  170.0  6  128.4
Baking  6  5,629.0  4  6421.3  2  4,044.4
BuUding  and civil  engineerIg  224  115.6  132  141.0  92  79.2
Buildig materials  industy  61  254.6  35  319.6  26  167.0
Chemical  and rubber industries  27  1,198.5  20  804.0  7  2,325.8
Clothing  iJustry  2  378.5  1  1.0  - 721.4
Communication  4  16S.0  4  165.0  - -
Caisucti  activity  I  S11.2  I  S11.2  - -
CooliS, ho spring and tobacco indus  8  140.5  3  193.1  5  08.9
Cultul  service  4  40.3  3  36.8  1  50.8
Desp  Activity  87  S5.S  38  88.0  49,  30.7
Domeatle  trade  60  136.1  47  140.7  13  119.5
Ecotchnical  indusuy  52  327.0  38  300.2  14  399.7
Engineering  234  482.2  174  540.7  60  312.3
Food Indutry  148  216.2  87  275.9  61  131.0
Foripgntrade  34  1,121.1  31  1,180.2  3  S10.9
Forestry  2  93.5  I  26.7  1  160.3
Fuel indwtzy  IS  876.4  14  673.0  1  3,723.3
Fundamental science  2  146.9  2  146.9  - -
Gologcal  activity  30  66.6  14  88.2  16  47.7
Gla,  china  and stoneare  industries  18  614.2  16  667.9  2  184.4
Hotel  industry  4  56.2  4  56.2  - -
Houding  2  127.2  2  127.2  - -
Iurance  1  1,841.9  1  1,841.9  - -
Iron  nd sted industi  11  3,499.6  7  2,234.2  4  S,714.1
Leather,  boot-and-shoe  and furrier lad  7  315.9  6  223.8  1  868.4
Modial and other  halth seIc  2S  134.0  2S  134.0  - -
Melworking indu-try  21  S97.6  5  1,134.9  16  429.7
Non-ferrous  metallurgy  4  1,72S..1  3  217.5  1  6,248.2
Other industrial  tvies  8  193.6  S  277.0  3  54.7
Other producion  activity  5  228.8  5  228.8  - -
Other sevices  29  124.1  15  149.1  14  97.4
Personal ervic  9  62.6  9  62.6  - -
Printing  industry  9  181.1  8  152.7  1  408.2
Productlo of eloctric  powwr  ad  hea  17  3,836.2  17  3,836.2  - -
Publising activiUes  S  73.4  2  83.6  3  66.6
PulpandpaperIndustry  14  1,187.1  8  1,481.2  6  794.9
RocreoalS  srvices  7  224.3  S  288.6  2  63.6
Rsarch  and science ervices  2  47.S  2  47.S  - -
Resatch &dovlopaientnbabllindus  2S  84.9  9  77.1  16  89.4
Rsarch  &  developmeant  In building  7  26.0  2  ?3.3  5  7.1
Reearch & developmet in commercie  2  23.5  1  45.2  1  1.5
Resarc  A developmnat  In cosumer  7  142.0  1  3.5  6  16S.1- 11  -
Table  2 (Cnntinued)
Seor  and Size of Enterprim. Offered  in  the Firas  Wavo  (1991)
C S F R  CZECH  REPUBLI  SLOVAK  REPUBLIC
Avewage  Book  Averag Book  Average  Book
Number  of  Value  Numbar  of  Value  Number  of  Valuo
Subecor  Enwrprlae  Millio Kca  Enterprlc  (Milion  KlC)  Enterprieu  (Milion K¢J)
S;curAiy  and nationd dfence  18.3  4  15.4  1  32.1
Suyply ndeas  of goods  4  274.6  1  614.4  3  161.3
Suply  of agriculturalg  od  43  146.2  14  167.0  29  136.2
Teotleinduatry  42  293.1  36  272.2  6  418.1
Tranport  39  2S2.1  33  288.5  6  52.0
Wats raupy  6  83S.9  6  83S.9  - -
WoodworIn4g  ladunry  S1  233.2  34  190.9  17  317.8
Total  84182  381.3  57595  433.9  33S12  277.5
Table  3
Chracteuatl  of Enterprise Offered  in te  Firt  'Wave  (1991)
(Total)
Average  Average  Avorugo  Average  Average  Averago  Averge
Number  of  Book  Value  Equity/  Equity/  Profit/  PtofW  Employmm±/  Debt/
Enteprls.  (Mlion  K¢s)  Out  Emnploymn  Ouput  (S)  Equity  (%)  Output (%)  Equiy (%)
CSFR  1491  381.3  1.22  519.43  6.29  17.59  0.41  140.-
Czech  Republc  990  433.9  1.24  632.27  7.96  21.49  0.37  139.7
SlovakRepublic  S01  277.5  1.18  296.44  2.99  9.87  0.51  141.4,- 12  -
IV.  ano,e mD de:  W0o  Bought  What?
A.  CitZ
All Czechoslovak  citizens  eighteen  years  or older were  eligible  to participate  in the
coupon  scheme. Participation  required  purchase  aid registration  of a coupon  book at one of the 648
registration  centers  around  the country  by February  28, 1992.10  Coupon  books  were sold  for a
nominal  fee of Kcs 1000  plus a rngistration  fee  of Kcs  35, equivalent  to about  $35,  or one week  of
the averge wage. The Kcs 1000  fee was  used to cover  the costs  of runniue  q  . *upon  scheme. For
bidding  purposes,  the Kcs 1000  were  equivalent  to 1000  points." The coup  ,  .re  r..x tradable  in
the  prinary market' in which  the initial  distribution  of shares  would  occur,  '  were  fully  tradable
In the secondary  market.  bis initial  non-tradabiity  of coupons  is similar  to Lithuania  wnd  Mongolia.
In contrast,  Russia  allowed  immediate  tradability  of coupons  under  its privatization  scheme. A total
of 300 million  shares  were being  offered,  i.e. each  share  was  equivalent  to Kcs 1000  In book  value  of
the total of Kcs 300  billion  of book  value  to be privatized  in the coupon  scheme. In the initial
bidding  round,  three  shares  in an enterprise  were  equivalent  to 100  points.
The initial  response  to the coupon  scheme  was fairly  limited,  with  only  2 million
coupon  booklets  sold  by January  10, 1992,  despite  the government's  extensive  public  information
campaign. This  participation  rate was well  below  the government's  target  of 4-5 million  booklets.
The most  important  factor  in increasing  public  interest  in the scheme  was the advertisements  of the
Investment  Privatization  Funds  (IPFs),  which  were  similar  to mutual  funds,  some  of whom  promised
returns  of up to tenfold  or more  on coupon  books  if citizens  allowed  them  to manage  their shares.
Ihese promise were  not  that unroalistic  given  that  the average  book  value  on offer was equivalent  to
about  Kcs 150,000  for each  of the 2 million  owners  of voucher  booklets  (or 150  times  the amount  the
individuals  had actually  paid  for the coupons).  As the deadline  for registration  approached,
participation  increased  dramatically.  Ultimately,  8.5 million  people  registered  out  of an eligible- 13  -
population  of about 10.5 million. Despite  this increased participation,  there remained a large transfer
element to the coupon scheme because  the book value alone of the enterprises exceeded  the value of
coupons sold by 35 times.  Thus, each Czechoslovak  citizen was transferred claims on the equivalent
of Kcs 35,300 in book value terms (which is about $1250, or about one-half  of average per capita
income).
B.  Invstment Privatization  Funds
At the start of the process, 429 Investment  privatization  funds (IPF) were registered to
participate  in the coupon scheme, 264 of which wore based in the Czech Republic and 165 in
Slovakia. The largest IPFs were run by commercial  banks, saving  banks and insurance  companies,
which had credibility and reputations to preserve. In Czechoslovakia,  these funds emerged
independently,  unlike in other countries  such as Pcland, Kazakhstan  or Romania where funds to
manage enterprise shares are created by the state.
Law number  248 regulating  the behavior of the investment  funds and corporations  was
passed on April 28, 1992, well after the IPFs had started operations. This law restricts ownership  of
any IPF to 20% of the shares of any individual  enterprise, limits any single enterprise to 10% of the
IPF's total assets.  Because  many IPPs are grouped into "investment  companies"  there is an additional
restriction  that no investment  company, including  all its constituent  fimds, can hold more than 40% of
the shares in any individual  enterprise. These restrictions are intended to reduce the risks for
individuals  who buy shares in IPFs.  The law also specified  reporting requirements  and disclosure
rules for IPF operations, and limits the funds' fees to 3% of the assets they manage and a one-time
fee of 2% to cover initial costs.-14-
C.  Pricing  Policy
The pricing  rules adopted  by the  Price  Committee  based  in the Federal  Ministry  of
Finance  were  fairly  pragmatic  and  sought  to clear  the market  for shares  as soon  as possible. Unlike  a
normal  market  where  equilibrium  is reached  through  infinite  bidding  rounds,  the price  comnmittee  had
to insure  ccnvergence  within  a finite  number  of rounds. There  was a consistent  attempt  to undervalue
shares  to ensure  that oidders  would  not be left with  unused  points. Instead,  the National  Property
Fund  would  be left with  shares  that  were  not bought,  even  though  almost  all points  would  have  been
used. The pricing  policy  was  based  on the following  guidelines:
P  erfe  qtuilibrium  In the hypothetical  case  where  demand  by citizens  and  funds  was
exactly  equal  to supply,  all enterprise  shares  would  be sold in that  round." 1
Undersubscriptio  Where  a firm's shares  were  undersubscribed,  those  that  bid
receive  shares  at that  price and  remaining  shares  are offered  in the next  bidding  round
at a lower  price. This rule enables  the National  Property  Fund  to capture  the
"consumer  surplus"  associated  with  some  bidders  valuing  shares  in a particular
enterprise  more  than  the eventual  market  clearing  price.
Oversuscription  by less  than  25% Where  there  is excess  demand  for shares  that is
less  than  25%  of the shares  on offer, individual  citizens  were  given  priority. The
demand  of the investment  funds  is reduced  however  much  is necessary  to clear  the
market  at that  price.
Oversubscription  by more  than  25% Where  the excess  demand  is large,  all shares  are
offered  again  in the next  bidding  round  at a higher  price. The magnitude  of the price
adjustment  is a function  of relative  demand. For example,  where  demand  for an
enterprise  was  twice  as much  as the supply  of shares,  the price would  be adjusted
from 3 shares  for 100  points  to 3 shares  for 200  points. In some  cases  described- 15  -
below, there was "manual adjustment' of prices by the price committee  to reduce
market volatility.
What were the economic  consequences  of these pricing rules that governed the
auctioning  of shares?  The reduction in the demand of investment  funds in cases where there was
oversubscription  by less than 25% was a clear effort to bias the outcome  in favor of individual
citizens. Tis  served to help relatively "uninformed' buyers in the name of "popular  capitalism".
The price discrimination  rule that operated for shares that were undersubscribed  meant that the size of
the actual  transfer received by individual  bidders varied In book value terms.  The size of the
aconsumer  surplus" or revenue appropriated  by the state may have been greater under a non-
disaiminatory pricing rule.  Tbis would result when the demand  curve is lower in a price
discriminating  auction because bidders fear "overpaying"  for shares (the so-called "winner's curse").
Hypothetically,  revenues could be higher if the Cemand  curve shifts out when the "winner's curse"
problem is eliminated  through a non-price discriminating  auction.  In the case of Czechoslovakia,
where revenue generation  was not a priority, the discriminatory  price rule seems to have served the
objective of speed (by clearing the market quickly)  at the expense of equity (although  not necessarily
utility).
D.  An Assessment  of the Bidding  Rounds"
There were ultimately  five bidding rounds from March 1 to December 22, 1992. In
the early rounds when price divergence  across enterprises  was small, bidders focused on high quality,
high price companies. In the second and third rounds, it was still possible to buy shares in an
expensive  company  for the modest  price of 3/100 to 1/400.  By the third round when price
divergence  increased, there was a massive  shift in market demand  to low price firms, some of which
had been priced very low because of the excess supply of their shares in earlier rounds. Because  of- 16  -
this pattern of bidding, equilibrium  was reached more quickly in the market for high price shares,
whereas the low price share market was more volatile in the early rounds.
The IPFs started with almost three-quarters  of all voucher  points (72%) and ended
with about two-thirds (66%) of the book value offered in the first wave of the coupon scheme. The
largest shareholders  were the same IPFs that began the process with t..e most points - the Czech
savings bank (6.9% of shares), and the largest Czech and Slovak commercial  banks (2.9% and 2.6%
respectively). The ten largest IPFs controlled  23.6% of all shares at the end of the coupon scheme.
The distribution  of TP  shareholdings  was fairly normal and ranged from the smallest  IPF with 164
shares to the largest with 19,120,802  shares.  IPFs bids constituted  a declining  share of total bids with
each round (from a peak of 75% after the first round to about  50% in the later rounds). In contrast,
individuals  tended to bid more aggressively  in later rounds as they gathering more information.
Nevertheless,  IPF participation  rates and success at securing  shares in each round (with the exception
of round 4) tended to exceed those of individuals. This differential  performance  may be attributed to
the IPFs' better organization  and better information.
Enterprises  Characterstics and Prices.  What characteristics  determined  the final price
at which enterprises were sold?  Table 4 categorizes  firms into those that sold at low, medium and
high final prices and provides data on average characteristics  of these enterprises. The characteristics
that were associated  with different selling prices are discussed  below.- 17 -
Table 4:  Charactsics  of Enterprises  by Share Price (1991)
Avege Book
Value  Aveag Equity/  Avarap  Equity/  Average  Profit/  Aveoge  Prorit/  Avenge  Employ-  Average  Dcbi/
(Milion  Kos)  Output  EmploYmnt  Output  (%)  Equity  (%)  en/Output (%)  Equity  (*)
Hish  P,i.  Eatmprise  272.72  o."  339.62  13.55  35.94  0.38  173.32
Medium  Price  Euterprime  383.03  1.16  643.64  6.25  14.92  0.44  145.93
Price  Entepris  441.75  1.41  405.07  0.71  7.28  f.39  102.54
--  in  ound  in ebich  bidding  wvu ompted:
pi"  etepriuua: Sbarwfa/vestmen  Point <  - 0.015  or  3 sbar  per  200  point
;us pice anterprise:  Shaneinlveiment  Poibts  <  0.06  or  shades p_r  100  poins  ad  > 0.015  or 3 wbat per  200 points
.&W  price eteprises:  SbarueIvessme  Poina  >  - 0.08  ort  sham  pt  100  poins
Profitability. Perhaps  the most prominent  characteristic  of enterprises  that sold for
high prices  was their very high profitability. Profits  as a share of equity  were five
times  greater and profit/output  ratios  were 19  times greater thaa those  of low  price
firms. Despite  government  warnings  to the contrary, investors  did use past
profitability  as an indicator  of future  performance.
=.  Scale  was clearly  important  since  high price enterprises  tended  to be small  and
low price  enterprises  tended  to have  the highest  average  book  value. The size of the
enterprise  was not very important  for individual  citizens,  whose  shares  were actually
distributed  in favor of large enterprises  (Table  5).  Individual  investors  were simply
too small  to have  a serious  hope of influencing  management.  Instead,  they seemed  to
focus on large, well-known  enterprises. In contrast,  the IPFs, particularly  the small
and medium  ones, focused  on smaller  firms where they  could  hope to have greater
management  control." Small  IPFs acquired  shares in only 9 large  enterprises.
Medium  sized  IPFs also focused  on smaller  enterprises,  but also bought  shares  in 380
medium  sized  enterprises,  such  as food-related  industries. In contrast,  the large IPFs
had a wider  distribution  of shareholdings  which  included  larger enterprises. Because-1l8-
of the rule limiting  their  holdings  in any individual  enterprise  to 20%  of total  shares,
the large  IPFs had little  choice  but to diversify  their  bids  across  companies  of all
sizes. lhese size  preferences  of bidders  were clearly  reflected  in the sales  price of
firms  with investors  getting  more  shares  per investment  points  in larger enterprises.
Table 5: Number  of Eneprim  by Individual
and  IPF Shares  by Size  and Pac*
Sim oJnf  f,2dmls
S.aiI  Modium  Large
Individuual  751  527  213
(13%)  (30%)  (57%)
IPF by Sizel
Small  335  126  9
(71%)  (27%)  (2%)
Medium  470  380  99
(50%)  (40%)  (10%)
Large  291  368  16S
(35%)  (45%)  (30%;
High  Price  220  88  36
Modium  Price  340  254  97
Low Price  138  142  59
Shares/nvest-  0.054  0.078  0.086
Produtivi.  For high  price  firms,  capital/output  and capital/labor  ratios  tended  to be
low. This implied  that  high  price enterprises  were not  capital-intensive  and  had
relatively  small,  but  highly  productive  labor  fbrces  (as evidenced  by the low
labor/output  ratios  in Table  3).  Relatively  small  labor  forces  also meant  fewer
problems  associated  with  the redeployment  of labor  often  associated  with-19-
restructuring. Since it Is usually easier to hire than to fire labor, physical assets and
small but productive labor forces tended to be v.'ued  more highly. Past indebtedness
did not deter investors and high priced firms had the highest average debt/equity
ratios.  This average may have been biased upv rds by the banks, trading and
insurance  companies  which, by the nature of their activities, are highly leveraged."
Foreign Investor.  Foreign investor participation  was also an important  indicator  of
ultimate selling  price.  In the group of enterprises  that sold for high prices, foreigners
were likely to have shareholdings  that were over nine times greater on average than in
enterprises that sold for low ptices.  The average foreign investor  shareholding  for the
340 firms that sold at low prices was 0.21%; whereas it was 1.87% for the 341
enterprises that sold for high prices.  Although  average foreign investor shareholdings
look small, they are actually concentrated  in a handful of firms.  Thus, foreign
investor Interest  was considered  a good signal of enterprise prospects, in part because
there would be a major shareholder  with controlling  interest.
Rgublic.  Slovak firms so:d at prices that were 40% less than Czech firms on
average.  Czech bidders focused almost exclusively  on shares in the Czech Republic,
with less than 5% of their bids going to Slovak firms.  Individual Slovak investors  did
show some interest in Czech firms, with about 15% of bids placed for firms based in
the Czech Republic. In contrast, Slovak IPFs bid about 40% of their points on Czech
firms in the various bidding rounds.
V.  Conclusions
How successful  was Czechoslovakia's  approach to mass privatization? One's
conclusion  depends crucially on the criteria used to evaluate  success. In terms of the government's-20  -
own  stated  objectives  - to transform  ownership  through  a process  that  was fast and fair - the coupon
scheme  was successful.  The fairly narrow  objective  of Czechoslovakia's  privatization  program  -
ownership  transformation  - wu  driven  by the conviction  that 'ownership  mattcrs". Thus  any
assessment  of the coupon  scheme's  success  hinges  on whether  one  believes  that  simply  transferring
ownership  from the state  to the  private  sector  will result  In eventual  productivity  gains. This Is an
issue  that  has been  much  debated  and only  recently  has there has been  some  empirical  evidence  on the
wefare consequences  of privatization."  In detailed  case  studies  of twelve  enterprises  by Galal  et al,
productivlty  increased  in seven  firms  after  privatization  and remained  constant  in five. Domestic
welfare,  which  includes  benefits  to consumers,  govrnment, workers  and  competitors,  improved  in
ten out  of the twelve  cases. All of these  case  studies  which  have  found  that  ownership  matters  have
been  in market  economies  where  privatization  was  part of an incremental,  rather  than  a fundamental,
effort  to achieve  efficiency  gains. Therefore,  any  economic  assessment  for a transition  economy  must
also consider  the possible  consequences  for corporate  governance.  The conclusions  that  follow
evaluate  the scheme  in greater  detail  In terms  of speed,  equity,  and corporate  governance.
A.  Sped
In terms  of speed,  the coupon  scheme  was successful.  ITe inventory  of all state
enterprises  for privatization  took much  of 1991  with a full list of 2744  medium  and  large scale
enterprises  selected  for the first wave  published  in November  1991. Six months  elapsed  for the
supply  side  of the coupon  scheme  to be prepared,  privatizatdon  projects  to be selected',  and  a list of
the 1491  enterprises  included  was  published  in May  1992. The endre  bidding  process  took  eight
months  - from May  to December  of 1992; Thus  the cycle  of project  preparation,  public  information,
and  bidding  for almost  1500  enterprises  took a total  of 14 months  - an average  of over 3 medium
and large  scale enterprises  privatized  per day. The economic  gains  from speed  are more  rapid-21 -
restructuring  and  less scope  for asset  stripping  and 'spontaneous  privatization"  In the transition
period.
The major  sources  of delay  wor asociated  with  the supply  side, particularly  with
project  preparation  and review  as well  as with restitution  claims. Once  privatization  projects  were
identified,  the demand  side  proceeded  very quickly. Although  enterprisos  have  been  in a period  of
management  and  ownership  limbo,  that  undairable state  has been  relatively  shorter  than  in other
transition  economies.  Thi time  savings  can in part be attributed  to the government's  decision  not  to
restructure  in any substantial  way  prior wo  privatization.  Thero  was an additional  delay  in transferring
ownership  to the now  shareholdors  afker  the bidding  was completed  which  was caused  to a large
extent  by the break-up  of the Federation.  This was resolved  and shares  were iued  and  began
tmding  in the summer  of 1993. The IPFs  are beginning  to meet with  enterprise  management  to
review  balance  sheets  and  to define  a business  strategy. This is particularly  so with  the "plums'  in
the IPFs' portfolios,  but there  may  still  be a iargo  number  of enterprises  that  continue  to have no
effective  owner.
B.  Eguiix
The objective  of equity  was achieved  by establishing  a process  that was largely
transparent  and created  a level  playing  field  for all potential  buyers  of shares  thr(ugh the coupon
scheme. There was no systematic  bias in share  allocations  in favor  of "insiders"  (either  management
or workers),  in contrast  to the mass  privatization  scheme  in Russia,  Poland,  Kazakhstan  and
Lithuania. The government  provided  information  about  enterprises  to the public  and allowed  the
market  to interpret  the data. Thus  the govermment  did not  have  to address  the difficult  issues  of
valuation  of enterprises  in a transition  economy;  those  judgements  were  left to the collective  wisdom
of coupon  holders. In general,  the process  of generating  information  was highly  decentralized,- 22 -
although  market  clearing  was centralized  becau  it had  to be simultaneous.  Information  was also
provided  to those  interested  in submitting  privatization  proposals  and in managing  enterprisa.
Information  was also provided  to the public  and to the IPPs  (who  wer, also  decentralized  and
emerged  endogenously)  who  would  bid for shares  in these  enterprises.  The f -vernment's  role was
simply  one  of providing  a framework  and a set of rules in which  these  potential  managers,  firms  and
shareholders  could  find each  other.'9
The results  of the bidding  rounds  Indicate  the degree  to which  the public  used  the
information  provided  by the government.  Popular  firms  did  tend  to have  high  profits  i" the past and
a typgraphical error in the data  was enough  to swing  market  bids  dramatically  (such  as case  a of a
hotel  in t'ie firb: iddilug  round). But  informal  sources  of information  did play  a role,  as evidenced  by
the diversiL,  if enterprises  that  sold  for either  high or low  prices. There  was a large  element  of share
price  determination  that  could  not be explained  by published  information  alone. The fact  that  some
people  did  have 'insider information"  about  the true value  of some  enterprises  was  not considered  a
systemic  bias, particularly  since  such  privileged  information  would  often  be revealed  in the bidding
process.
The elements  of the privatization  process  that  were  the most  criticized  for unfairness
were precisely  those  elements  that were  the least  transparent.  In particular,  the review  of competing
privatization  proposals  on the supply  side  had a large  subjective  element  which  left scope  for
favoritism.  The requirtment  that  proposals  chosen  for inclusion  in the privatization  program  be
reviewed  by both the founding  Ministry  and  the Ministry  of Privatization  did provide  one, albeit
imperfect,  check  against  croonyism.  The only  other  process  that lacked  full transparency  was the
workings  of the price committee  which  set new  prices  after  each  bidding  round. The working  of this
committee  was sometimes  criticized,  but there were  never  any serious  allegations  made. Other  issues
such  as the discriminatory  pricing  rule and the fact  that  some  people  were left with  unused  and- 23 -
worthless points at the end of the process, could be considered 'unfair" outcomes  that emerged from
a "fair process.  In general, the transparency  of the process was critical for insuring broad-based
public support for the privatization  process.
The privatization  of insolvent  enterprises also raises a number of equity issues.
Enterprises were required to proceed with privatization,  regardless of declared insolvency,  to avoid
maagement  using financial  distress as an excuse  for avoiding  privatization. The consequence  is that
som. individuals  and IPFs hold worthless shares and (conceivably)  potential liabilities. Although the
actual  losses incurred by shareholders  are likely to be small, since they paid only a nominal fee,
political support for the privatization  program will be adversely affected. The situation is more
complex in cases where insolvent  bsnlks  have been privatized. In general, bank shares sold for high
prices, despite knowledge  of substantial  bad loan portfolios,  possibly reflecting expectations  of an
eventual government  bail out.  However, any such bail out would result in either windfalls  to existing
shareholders  or 're-nationalization' of the banks.  Because  of this clear trade-off between equity and
credibility of the privatization  program, firms that were known for certain to be insolvent  should
probsbly have been excluded from the voucher scheme. Instead, the government  could have
reorganized  these firms to privatize  the viable parts and liquidated  any remaining  assets.
C.  Co=orate Governanea
What was the distribution  of ownership that resulted from the coupon scheme and
what are the implications  for corporate governance? Table 6 provides the average distribution  of
shares between individuals  and IPFs that resulted jOrom  the coupon scheme. For the entire sample,
shares are split almost evenly between  individuals  and investment  funds.  The average firm in the
sample has about 3 investment  funds involved  as shareholders. However, in the Czech Republic, the
Investment  funds tend to have controlling  interest whereas in Slovakia, it is individual  citizens who- 24  -
are in the majority.  There is also an extreme
polarization  based on the final selling price of  Table 6:  Governance: Average  Distribution
of Enterprise Ownership
the firm - with the investment  funds having  in the Coupon  Schene
clear majorities in medium and high price firms  Coupon  Scheme
and individuals  dominating  in low price firms.  Individuals  IPFs
This pattern would seem to reinforce the greater  Total  48.6  51.4
likelihood  of success of enterprises  that sold for  Czech  45.3  54.7
Slovak  55.1  44.9
relatively higher prices.  Non-coupon  Low  Price  56.6  43.4
shareholders  in the 1491  enterprises  are also  Medium  Price  42.7  57.3
distributed very unevenly across Republics  and  high Price  47.7  52.3
across enterprises of different prices.  On
average, Czech firms have much larger shareholdings  by foreign and domestic investors, restitution
claims, bank and local authorities. In contrast, governance in Slovak firms is far more diffuse on
average.  In fact, such diffuse ownership  by individual  coupon holders may result in de facto
management  control, more along the lines of so-called 'spontaneous privatization"  in other countries.
Similarly, high price firms also have a greater proportion  of their shares held by significant  non-
coupon interests relative to low price firms.  Thus the initial prospects  for corporate governance  are
far more favorable in Czech firms and in firms that sold for higher prices.
In  many countries, there is a strong tendency  for share ownership to quickly become
concentrated  after the initial dispersion  of ownership caused  by  mass privatization.'  It is not
surprising that many individuals  participate in the process to take advantage  of the transfer element,
which they are keen to convert into a cash transfer as soon as possible. Thus those that are
interested  in  actually  managing the  firm tend  to buy 'out  those who participated  in order to take
advantage  of the public transfer.  However, in Czechoslovakia,  this process of concentration  has- 25 -
been  partially  thwarted  in part by the law restricting  IPFs' shares  to  20% in any enterprise,  which  is
intended  to protect  shareholders  in the IPFs. Nevertheless,  one can expect  cash-poor  shareholders  to
sell shares  to cash-rich  investors,  in effect  simulating  direct  sales  through  the secondary  market.
Nevertheless,  the key  players  will be the IPFs, who  control  most  of the shares  and are
likely  to be at the forefront  of financial  deepening  and enterprise  restructuring.  The behavior  of these
IPFs is not yet known. The evidence  from  the bidding  process  indicates  that  there was an effort  by
IPFs to focus  on firms  where  they  could  have  controlling  interests. Early  anecdotal  evidence  cf IPFs
taking  an activist  role in enterprise  management  is encouraging.  There are also cases  of individual
investors  forming  shareholder  associations.  But  the IPFs will also  be under  enormous  pressure  to
distribute  dividends  to shareholders  (to whom  they  made  promises  of substantial  quick  returns),  which
may  result in decisions  inconsistent  with  restructuring  for the long  term. The interests  of minority
shareholders  may  also  be jeopardized  . It is also  not yet clear  from where  the capital  for
restructuring  will come. Since  coupon  privatization  does  not bring  new  money  into the firm, owners
will have  to rely on retained  profits,  new investors,  or the banks  for investment.  Without
modifications  to the regulatory  framework  for investment  funds,  some  protection  for minority
shareholders,  and  some  clarification  of the relationship  between  banks  and investment  funds,  the
process  of restructuring  after  privatization  is likely  to be more  costly  than  necessary  and fraught  with
moral  hazard  and agency  problems.
It is possible  to thiak  of four  possible  outcomes  depending  on the competitiveness  of
enterprises  and  the eventual  character  of corporate  governance  (Figure  2).  In those  cases  where
enterprises  prove  to be viable  under  current  competitive  conditions  and  have  effective  governance
either  through  a major  shareholder  or through  associations  among  IPFs or individuals),  pr-luctivity
gains  from  privatization  will result. These  will  be the success  stories  of mass  privatization.  Another
possibility  are enterprises  that  are not viable.  Those  in the fourth  quadrant  of figure  2 would  move  to- 26 -
bankruptcy  proceeings, assuming  implementation  of Czechoslovakla's  stated  commitment  to avoiding
continued  subsidies  to nonv.able  enterprise. Because  of the speed  of the process,  the advantage  of
mass  privatization  is that  these  frm  would  start  bankruptcy  procedures  relatively  sooner,  thereby
.educing  the costs  to society  of keeping  then  afloat. ITose firms  in the  third quadrant  would  adlo
move  to bankruptcy.  But  had there been  some  effort  at restructuring  prior to privatization.  some
parts  may  have  been  viable  and  productive.  The fourth  possibility  are enterprises  that  are viable,  but
for whatever  reasons  lack  effective  governance.  This last  group  can be considered  the seal 'casualtl
of mass  privatization'  - firms  that  might  have  made  productivity  gains  if a different  method  of
privatization  had  been  used.









non-  bankruptcy,  but  smaller  bankruptcy
viable  loss  with restructuring  and
before  privatization?  liquidation
The likely  success  of a mass  privatization  scheme  depends  to a large  extent  on the
distribution  of enterprises  across  these  quadrants  in Figure  2.  The differences  across  the Czech  and
Slovak  Republics  illustrate  the point. In fact,  the privatization  program  was almost  like  a controlled
experiment  with  the same  policy  applied  to two  different  economies.  In the Czech  Republic,  where
the structure  of industry  was more  competitive,  the mass  privatization  scheme  seems  to have  worked- 27 -
far better.  There was genuine competition  on the supply side with the average Czech firm sought
after by over 17 different privatization  proposals. A greater portion of shares were brought by
foreign or domestic investors who sought controlling  interests. The higher prices at which Czech
firms sold in the bidding rounds was an indicator  of the market's assessment  of the greater viability
and profitability of Czech enterprises. There seems to be more evidence  of shareholder and
particularly IPF management  activism  In the Czech Republic. Thus a better initial position (more
enterprises in the first quadrant)  at the start of privatization  resulted in a better initial position  for
restructuring.
In contrast, in Slovakia, with a less competitive  enterprise sector, there were far fewer
privatization  proposals (2.9 for each enterprise on average) and no real competition  among  potential
buyers (more firms in quadrants  3 and 4).  Ninety-two  percent of enterprise shares were sold through
vouchers directly to citizens  with no other investors with significant  controlling  interests. Thus the
initial shareholding  structure in Slovakia is more diffuse  than that in the Czech Republic with more
firms in quadrants  2 and 4.  Also, because  both the banks and the IPFs are very oligopolistic  in
Slovakia, there seems to be little pressure on them to initiate  enterprise restructuring. It is almost
trivial to say that privatization  is more difficult  in economies  characterized  by heavy industries  that
were artificially established  through central planning. But the choice among different approaches  to
privatization  depends crucially on the trade-off  between losses associated  with the time taken to
:structure enterprises  prior to privatization  versus losses from potentially  viable enterprises  that
emerge with poor governance under a mass privatization  scheme.
D.  Concludini Remarks
Political  Visin.  Perhaps the most important  element in Czechoslovakia's  mass
privatization  prograrn was the clear political commitment  to a bottom-up  process.  Without such a-28 -
vision, and an administrative  infrastructure  with integrity  to implement  it, the scope for political in-
fighting and corruption to thwart privatization  are enormous. 'This is perhaps the most difficult thing
to replicate In other countries. The other key factor was that privatization  was n= asked to achieve
too many  objectives  beyond ownership  transformation. Too often, the privatization  process is
expected  to address regional development,  unemployment,  and fiscal shortfalls. None of these were
objectives  of Czechoslovakia's  mass privatizaon  program. While there was some attempt to evaluate
the quality of business  plans submitted  by competing  privatization  proposals, there was no attempt  to
systematically  favor proposals that promised  to invest in cortain regions or to preserve jobs.  From a
budgetary  point of view, the coupon scheme was irrelevant. The Kcs 1000  paid by each of the 8.5
million individuals  participating  in the procoss was set to cover the expenses of running the scheme.
In fact, because of the desire to transfer assets  to the public, the scheme actually  had adverse
budgetary consequences  in the short run if the counterfactual  is privatization  through direct sales to
domestic and foreign buyers. 21 In the long run, however, a more profitable  privatized  enterprise
sector is likely to mean enhanced tax revenues  for the government.
Dealing with the Information  Problem. Privatization  in transition economies  is
essentially  an information  problem.  The process tends to stall on issues such as valuation  of
enterprise assets and the viability of a firm under a completely  different set of relative prices.  The
major achievement  of the Czech and Slovak approach  was in creating a process that generates
information  and treats it like a public good.  Markets that are information-intensive  are often
imperfect, especially  where there are large fixed costs associated  with being informed. In
Czechoslovakia,  these 'fixed costs' were shared by all citizens  participating  in the scheme and the
resulting process of centralized  bidding by decentralized  actors generated  the best available
information  to increase the competitiveness  and efficiency  of the market.-29 -
The special  role of information  bocomes  apparent  when  the sequential  rounds  and
simultaneous  bidding  used  in Czechoslovakia  are compared  to some  alternatives.  For example,  a
single  simultaneous  bidding  round  that  allows  agents  to make  multiple  bids (thereby  revealing  their
demand  curve)  could  have  been  used,  but would  have  favored  those  who  had access  to privileged
Information  and  gonerated  no intermediary  information  for other  bidders. Similarly,  an auction  that
was not simultaneous,  but was conducted  individually  for each  enterprise  (similar  to that  occufring  in
Russia)  would  not have  generated  the relative  price information  that  facilitated  the emergence  of a
market  equilibrium.  The particular  advantage  of the Czechoslovak  approach  was that the bidding
rounds  themselves  served  to put information  about  enterprise  values  in the public  domain  by allowing
increaingly  informed  bidders  to interact. Thus  there were  clear  positive  externalities  for uninformed
bidders.-30-
ANNEXES
Annex  A:  Preparation  of Enterprises  for Privatizatlon
An inventory  of all state  property  was conducted  in 1991  and information  wa
published  to solicit  privatization  proposals. Enterprisa were  divided  into two 'waves depending  on
their rediness for privatization  and a small  third category  consisted  of fim  that  would  remain  In
stoa hands. Many  of the more  complex  privatizations  - such  as  onrgy, health  services  and
qrlculture - were  postponed  to the second  wave. The inventory  of enterprises  for the first wave  of
lae  scale  privatization,  consisting  of 2744  enterprises,  was  published  on November  20, 1991  with  a
deadline  for submitting  projects  of January  20, 1992. Tbe list of enterprises  for the second  wave  was
published  on April  16, 1992  with  a deadline  for submissions  of June 16, 1992.
Privatization  projects  included  proposals  on what  proportion  of shares  would  be sold
through  which  means,  but founding  ministries  also  made  recommendations  about  the use of different
methods  of privatization.  In general,  there  was a strong  preference  for competitive  processes  -
such  as public  auctions,  tendors,  or vouchers  - over  direct  sales  to predetermined  buyers.> In the
case  of privatization  by direct  sale,  the decision  also  had  to be approved  by the Economic  Council  of
the government,  to insure  transparency  and  then  implemented  by the National  Property  Fund, the
executing  agency  for privatization.  In the vast majority  of cases,  domestic  and foreign  buyers  were
treated  identically.  All privatization  projects  also  had  to insure  that  all restitution  claims  have  been
met or that resources  have  been  set aside  to meet  future  restitution  claims. Three  percent  of the
shar  of all joint stock  companies  undergoing  privadzation  were set aside  in a National  Restitution
Fund. Where  restitudon  claims  were  clear, the property  was  returned  to the original  owner  and
resulted  in one of the quickest  forms  of privatization.  But  resdtution  claims  also  slowed  down  the- 31 -
privatization  process in many cases where there were legal complications  surrounding claims.  In
cases where the state itself could not document  its own ownership, and therefore its right to privatize
an enterprise, delays resulted.
Review  of competing  proposals was conducted  by the sectoral or "founding"
ministries initially who passed on their recommendations  to the Ministries  of Privatization  in the
Czech and Slovak Republics. In the early stages, there was an emphasis  on the quality of
privatizatlon  proposals and in particular the business plan and investment  commitnent presented by
the buyer.  After criticism  that these criteria were too subjective  and time-consuming,  the new
govermment  began to rely more heavily on price as a criteria for selecting  buyers where direct sales
wore involved.'  lhere  was also some divergence  in views between  the Federal Ministry of Finance
which originally  preferred voucher  privatization  and the Republic-level  Founding Ministries  and
Ministries  of Privatization  which generally  preferred direct sales.  The Federal Ministry of Finance
saw the governrment's  role as simply one of processing projects (most of which were expected  to be
basic projects proposed by enterprise management)  and insuring that issues such as restitution  and
foreign investment  were managed according  to the law.  The Ministries  3f Privatization  wanted to
take a more active role in evaluating  the quality  of altemative  proposals and tended to prefer direct
sales over methods that would result in more diffuse ownership.
Nevertheless,  the review by the Republic-level  Ministry of Privatization  was an
important  check to insure that the process was not biased in favor of existing management  and did not
simply reinforce old power structures. This final review function concentrated  a great deal of power
in the hands of the M.nistries of Privatization, which in some cases did overturn the recommendation
of the founding ministry.  In order to accelerate  the process and protect it from excessive  lobbying,
the final approvals  of projects by Ministry  of Privatization officials  were conducted in isolated
locations outside of Prague and Bratislava. In an intensive month, those projects that would be- 32 -
included in the voucher scheme were reviewed and selected. Those responsible  for alternative
projects were summoned  to give additional  information  as needed to sequestered  government  officials.
The major delays in the large privatization  process occurred because of problems  on
the supply side.  The original target for basic project submissions  was October 31, 1991 and
November  30, 1991 for competing  projects, which would have allowed  the bidding process to begin
In January 1992. However, the Ministries of Privatization  extended the deadline for project
submissions  by two months  to allow for more competitive  proposals. The result was that about  three-
quarters of all proposals were competitive  projects and only one-quarter originated  from the
enterprise.  Because  this enabled additional  proposals  to be submitted, the time required to review
alternative  privatization  projects was greater, causing  further delays.  Ultimately, rather than begin in
January 1992, the bidding  process began in May 1992. This was still before the June 1992
parliamentary  elections, which was an important  deadline  for the government  which wanted to show
quick results and to create stakeholders  in privatization  among  the electorate. Although  this delay
was a great source of tension within the government, five months is a relatively short time
considering the setbacks  to privatization  experienced  in other countries.
Outcome  on the Supply Side of the First Wave:  Divergence  Across Republics
A total of 18,106 privatization  projects were submitted in the first wave, of which
16,609 were submitted in the Czech Republic, 1,436 in the Slovak Republic, and 61 at the Federal
level.21 Of these projects in the Czech Republic, 3638 were basic projects submitted  by enterprise
management  and 12,971 were competing  projects. This implies that in the Czech Republic, the
average enterprise had 17.6 projects submitted, 13.8 of which were submitted by competing
"outsiders.'  In contrast, in the Slovak Republic, the average enterprise had only 2.9 projects
submitted, 1.4 of which were from competing  "outsiders." Of course the number of projects-33  -
submitted  varied  enormously  across  enterprises.  But it is clear  that in the Czech  Republic  the supply
aide  was far more  competitive  than  in Slovakia,  where  rmore  proposals  were  submitted  by insiders
than  outsiders  and  where  there were  fewer  interested  parties  for any given  enterprise.
The projects  submitted  in the first  wave  varied  across  the spectrum  of privatization
methods,  but the distribution  varied  signiflcantly  across  the Czech  and Slovak  Republics.  Relatively
more  Czech  enterprises  were privatized  through  direct  sale whereas  more  Slovak  firms  were sold
through  the coupon  scheme. In the Czech  Republic,  about  45%  of the proposals  were  for direct
sales,  22% for commercialization  to a joint stock  company  which  was a precondition  to voucher
privatization,  11%  were for public  auction,  8% for public  tendor,  8% were  for unpaid  transfer  to
municipalities  or financial  institutions,  and 4% were for privatization  of a stateowned  joint-stock
company.27  In the Slovak  Republic,  55% of total  book  value  privatized  was sold  through  the
coupon  scheme  and only  8% was sold  through  standard  methods  such as direct  sale. The remaining
shares  were placed  in the National  Property  Fund  or were  set aside  for restitution  claims.- 34-
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Annax  C:  Bidding  Dynamics
The government  feared  that  investors  would  hold back  in the early  rounds  to see how
prices  evolved. To discourage  this, it was announced  that  any round  could  be the final  one, so that
those  who  waited  risked  being  left with worthless  points  that  they  had not  bid.  This  brought  bids
forward  Inter-temporally  and encouraged  agents  to use their 'optlon to bid  before  the termination
date, by not  proaniouncing  when  the process  would  and.  is a consequence,  participation  rates  were
very high  In most  rounds. The error rate  was very low, with  less  than  0.1  % of all bids  not  processed
because of mistakes in filing.  The timetable  for bidding was as follows:
Schedule for the Flrst Wave - 1992
RoBm  ADd  nor  Bid  s  End ofn
0  March I  April26  May 1S
1  May18  June 8  June 30
2  July 8  July 28  August 18
3  Augut  26  September  1S  October 6
4  October 14  October 27  November 17
S  November  23  December 2  Decomber  22
Zero Round: Power to the IPPs
The zero round gave individual  citizens  the opportunity  to hand over their points to
the IPPs.  It also served as an opportunity for individuals  to self-select  into groups of informed and
uninformed  buyers.  Because uniformed  buyers were more likely to give their points to an investment
fund, the zero roind  increased  the proportion  of Information  relative to 'noise'  that would emerge
from the market.  At the end of the zero round, 71.8% of the total points available in the first wave
were given to the IPFs for management,  and 6.31 million coupon  holders (or 74% of citizens- 42 -
participating)  invested  at let  100  of their 1000  points  in an IPF. 5.81 million  citizens  invested  all
their 1000  points  in an 1PF  and 4.7 million  Invested  all their  points  in just one IPF.  This outcome
made  it apparent  that, contrary  to initial  views,  the IPFs  would  have a major  role to play in the mass
privatizatlon  scheme.
The zero  round  also  revealed  the degree  of market  power  exercised  by the large IPFs.
The 20 largest  IPFs controlled  more  than  50% of all points  available  for bidding. The largest  IPF,
owned  by the Czech  uviDgs  bank,  controlled  6.9% of all points. Tbis was followed  by the
Invstmen fiuxd  owned  by the major  commercial  banks  - Czech  Komercni  (2.9%  of all points)  and
Slovak  VUB  (2.6  % of all points). The largest  IPF not owned  by a bank,  First Investment
Privatization  Fund, controlled  2.5% of all points. The 118  medium  sized  IPFs  controlled  only 17%
of available  points  and the 300  small  IFFs controlled  a mere  5% of all available  points. Thus  there
was a major  divergence  in market  power  of IPFs by size,  but there  were a sufficient  number  of large
:PFs to allay fears  of oligopolistic  behavior  by any  single  IPF.
Round  1: Biddingf  Bona=z
Participation  rates  were  very high in the first round  with  95%  of IPFs' points  bid  and
84% of individual  investors'  points  bid.  All  shares  were initially  priced  at 3 shares  per 100  voucher
points  (3/100). The theoretical  market  clearing  pricc, which  would  equilibrate  the supply  of shares
with  the demand  in terms  of total  points,  was  3.5 shares  for 100  points  at the start  of the first round.
Of course  the strt  price  was fairly  arbitrary  and about  65% of points  bid were  unfulfilled  because
of oversubscription.  Neverthieless,  30%  of all shares  were  sold and  35%  of points  were satisfied  at
the end of the first round  at this initial  price. This  resulted  in 48 enterprises  sold  in the first round,
which  was ac leved  by adjusting  the excess  demand  by the IPFs to dear the market. Detailed  results
from  the first  bidding  round  are provided  in Table  C-1.-43 -
Where  there  was  undenrubscription  of shares,  three  pricing  rules  were applied:  (1)
where  demand  amounted  to less  than  20% of offered  shares,  prices  in the range  of 8/100-10/100  were
set; (2) where  demand  wu between  20%  and 67%  of shares  suppliad,  prices were  fixed  at 7/100; (3)
where  demand  exceeded  67% and  there were  few  remaining  shares,  prices  were raised  slightly  to
between  1/200  and 6/100. The relative  demand  rule was  used  to adjust  prices  up to excess  demand
that was nine  times  the available  supply  of shares. For twelve  enterprises  for which  demand  was in
excess  of ninefold,  prices  wro adjusted  man  lly to a maximum  price  of 1/400. These  pricing  rules
were intended  to reduce  market  volatility  by not adjusting  prices  too quickly  in any  round. Although
there was substantial  excess  supply  after  the first round,  the price adjustment  made  at the end  of the
round was relatively  small. While  the thoretiodcal  average  market  clearing  price  would  have  been  3.77
shares  per 100  points,  prices  were  adjusted  to an average  price  of 3.25 shares  per 100  points,  thereby
ensuring  that  some  excess  supply  of shares  would  persist  in the next  round.
There  were  differences  in the behavior  of individual  investors  and  funds  in each
Republic  that  became  apparent  in the first  round. Ninety-nine  percent  of Czech  individuals  bid for
Czech  firms  and 95%  of the Czech-based  IPFs bid fur Czech  firms. In Slovakila,  individual  investors
also concentrated  on firms  in their own  Republic  (81%),  but only  53%  of the points  of Slovak  IPFs
were allocated  to Slovak  firms. Thus  all individual  investors  tended  to focus  on enterprises  in their
own Republics,  possibly  because  of familiarity  with  certain  enterprises  and owing  to fears about  legal
complications  associated  with  the impending  break-up  of the Federation.  In the case  of the funds,
there was a divergence  with  Czech  IPFs  concentrating  on Czech  enterprises  whereas  Slovak  IPFs
spread  their  bids almost  evenly  across  the two  Republics. Because  individual  Slovak  investors  tended
to bid for Slovak  firms  (for which  their was less  competing  demand),  they were  more  successful  at
realizing  their bids. In the first  round,  43  % of the bids  of Slovak  individuals  resulted  in shares,- 44 -
compared  to 27%  for Czech  individuals,  and  40%  for the IPFs. The low  effectiveness  of Czech
individuals'  bids  reflected  their  tendency  to bid for enterprises  for which  there was excess  demand.
At the start  of the  second  round  (See  Table  C-2), price  adjustment  resulted  in a
minimum  price  of 10  shares  for 100  points  and a maximum  price of 400  points  for 1 share  -
equivalent  to a forty-fold  price  spread  from  the lowest  to the highest  price shares. There  is
interesting  anecdotal  evidence  about  the degree  to which  bidders  used  the information  provided  by the
government  about  enterprise  performance.  In one  famous  case,  a typographical  error resulted  in an
extra  zero  bein2  added  to the profits  of a hotel  being  offered  for privatization.  At the end  of the first
round,  demand  for shares  of this hotel  were about  400  times  the supply  of shares  - implying  the
bidden relied  fairly  heavily  on published  data in addition  to 'insider' information.  This hotel  became
the maximum  price  enterprise  entering  the second  bidding  round.
Table C-1: Bidding  Dynarmics  - First Round
Numbe.  of  Number  of  Number  of  Total  shars  sold/
Number  sham offered  shares ordered  sha  sold  total shares offered
of fims  b  Millions)  (In  millions)  a  illions)  (In phrcontl
Excess  supply  of shares  1022  224.5  74.4  74.4  33.1
Small  excess  demand  48  15.0  16.3  15.0  100.0
Exces demand  421  59.9  145.0  0.0  0.0
Toal  1491  299.4  235.7  89.4  29.9
of which:
Czech  Republic  990  212.5  187.1  68.0  32.0
Slovak  Republic  501  86.9  48.6  21.4  24.6
Round  2:  Investment  Pause and Ouality Focus
Participation  rates  between  individuals  and  funds  diverged  in the second  round,  with
the funds  bidding  92% of their  points  and individual  investors  only  bidding  78%  of their  available
points.  The  differences  in bidding  across  Republics  persisted,  with only  the Slovak  IPFs bidding-45 -
heavily  for onterprises  in the other  Republic. A total of 72 enterprises  were  sold in the second  round
tirough  the reduction  of excess  demand  from the IPFs. However,  53  % of all orders  were  successful
ad 37%  of all shares  were  sold - a major  improvement  in only  two  bidding  rounds. In general,  it
was  the more  expensive  shares  that  were  sold in the second  round. The average  share  price sold  was
2.28 shares  for 100  points,  which  was well  above  the market  average. This  was the beginning  of the
divergence  between  the fulfillment  of points  more  rapidly  than  shares  - which  insured  that  the
Natonal Property  Funds  would  be left with  shares  that  were  not demanded.  However,  most
entucprisea  were still  characterized  by excess  supply  of their  shares.
Price  adjustment  after  the completion  of the second  round  was based  on information
about  relative  demand  in rounds  one and  two and  on the remaining  shares  to be sold  in round  thro.
For firms  whose  shares  had experienced  excess  demand  in both  of the previous  rounds,  prices were
adjusted  upward  as a proportion  of the excess  demand  in round  two, which  resulted  in a maximum
price of 1/800  in cases  where  demand  exceeded  supply  of shares  by five  times. In the case  of
unpopular  companies  that  experienced  excess  supply  of shares  in both rounds,  a downward  adjustment
wa made  based  on relative  demand  in round two. However,  in those  cases  where  the number  of
unsold  shares  were  greater  than  950,000,  prices  were adjusted  downward  by an order  of ten,
regardless  of the magnitude  of relative  demand  in round  two. 2'  There  is some  evidence  that  the
price committee  adjusted  share  prices  excessively  downward  for underdemanded  enterprises  after  the
first two rounds  because  they  feared  little  market  interest  in certain  firms.'  Many  of these
enterprises  that  were heavily  undersubscribed  after  the first  two  rounds  were  some  of the larger,
heavy  industries. The over-adjustment'  of these  enterprise  prices  resulted  in excess  demand,
especially  by individuals,  in subsequent  rounds.- 46  -
Table C-2:  Bidding Dynamla  - Second Round
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Total  sharos  sold/
Number  abrs offered  shus  ordered  shar  sold  tota  ros  offered
of firms  {n  fmiMilons)  /n  M  millions  anREcont)
Exce  supply  of shares  930  165.6  6S.2  65.2  39.4
Small  excess  demand  72  12.6  13.5  12.6  100.0
Exces demad  441  31.8  69.4  0.0  0.0
Total  1443  210.0  148.2  77.8  37.1
of which:
Czech  Republic  958  144.4  115.1  59.2  41.0
Slovak  Republic  485  65.5  33.1  18.6  28.4
Round 3:  Market Divergenge  and Unreoulted  Bargain Hunting
The price adjustment  was probably  greatest in the third round (See Table C-3) when
dhe sprnud  between the highest and lowest price firms was 776-fold. There was a surge of demand In
the third round, possibly a reflection of the large price divergence  or of demand by individual
investors who may have held back in the second round until they had more information  about
probable equilibrium  selling prices.  These relatively uninformed  bidders may have waited to see what
information  was generated by the market before exercising  their option to bid.  Participation rates
were high with only 50,000 individuals  remaining  who had not yet bid in any round.  In contrast, the
investment  funds, who were at a structural disadvantage  because of the bidding rules, bid fairly
aggressively  throughout  the process.
By the third round, two-thirds  of all shares on offer were sold and 87% of cumulative
points were satisfied. In general it was lower price shares that were popular in the third round.  The
average price of shares for which there were bids fell dramatically  from 3.04/100 to 13.76/100.
However, a lower proportion of bids, only 12%, were successful, compared  to a high of 53% in the
second round.  Ultimately, the average price of shares sold was 2.28/100 - implying  Lhat  while
investors bid aggressively  for low price shares, equilibrium  tended to occur only with high price- 47  -
shares.  Only 51 enterprises -'ece completely  privatized in the third round, with 81  1 firms
experiencing  excess supply of snares and 507 enterpris  Es,  many with low price shares, characterized
by excess demand.  The differences  in bidding behavior  across Republics  persisted in the third round
and was increasingly  reflected in price divergence. The average price of shares bought in the Czech
Republic was 2.55/100, while it was 5.59/100 in the Slovak Republic.
Table C-3: Bidding  Dynamics  - Third Round
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Tot'l  ares sold/
Number  shares  offered  s:iare ordered  shares  sold  total share offered
of firms  (In  millions)  (In millions)  (In  millions  (la 2gmtl
Excess  supply  of shares  811  51.3  28.3  28.3  S5.2
Small  excoss  demand  51  4.2  4.5  4.2  100.0
Excess  demand  507  76.6  241.1  0.0  0.0
Total  1369  132.1  273.9  32.5  24.6
of which:
Czech  Republic  901  85.2  175.8  20.7  24.3
Slovak  Republic  468  46.9  98.1  11.8  25.2
Round 4:  An Emerging Equilibrium
By the fourth round (See Table C4),  93% of points had been used and 79% of shares
had been sold.  In the vast majority  of companies, only a portion of the total supply of shares
remained for sale.  Only three companies  remained with no shares yet sold because of excess demand
in previous rounds.  By this time, there was also evidence  of convergence  to equilibrium  prices.  The
minimum  share price was actually  raised - from 97/100 to 60/100-  and the maximum  price was
only increased  by 25% - from 1/800 to 1/1000. This reduced the spread between  the highest and
lowest price firms to 600-fold, from the high of 776-fold in the third bidding round.  Di Terential
bidding behavior between Czechs and Slovaks  persisted and were translated  into average prices.  The- 48 -
aveage  price for an enterprise in the Czech Republic was 6.63/100 while that in the Slovak Republic
was 8.67/100 in the fourth round.
Compared  to the third round, the fourth was one in which more bids (35%) were
successful at obtaining  shares.  This is because a large proportion  of bids in the third round had gone
to low price firms for which there had been excess demand and r&o  bids were fulfilled. Eighty
enterprises were sold in the fourth round (including  one in which demand exactly equaled  supply),
bringing  the cumulative  total sold to 253 companies. The average selling price was 10.68/100  -
which implied  that Investors  focused on lower price flrms In the fourth round.
The greater success of the IPFs in securing shares became  apparent in the fourth
round when the number of individual  investors' points available for bidding (0.58 billion) exceeded
that of the IPFs (0.55) for the first time.  Ihis  implied  that in the previous rounds, the IPFs were
more successful at translating  their bids into points than were individuals. A major explanation  must
lie in the IPFs consistently  higher participation  rates as well as their access to better information. In
the fourth round the IPFs bid virtually all of their available  points while individuals  only used about
77% of their points.
Table C-4:  Bidding Dynamics - Fourth Round
Number of  Number  of  Number of  Total shares sold/
Number  shares  offered  shares  ordered  shares  sold  total  shares  offered
of firm  (In millions)  (In millionsl  (In millions)  .(In  percent)
Excess supply of shares  868  43.5  27.0  27.0  62.1
Smll excess  demand  80  10.1  10.8  10.1  100.0
Exces demand  369  46.0  69.0  0.0  0.0
Total  1317  99.6  106.8  37.1  37.2
of which:
Czech  Republic  877  64.5  66.1  25.5  39.5
Slovak  Republic  440  35.1  40.7  11.6  33.0-49 -
Round  go Locking  into  the Market  Before  it is TIo Late
The Conter  for Voucher  Privatization  announced  that  the flfth  round  would  be the last
and encouraged  all coupon  holders  to repeat  their  bids  from the fourth  round  or to avoid  bidding  for
enterprises  that  were already  characterized  by excess  demand  to maximize  the number  of orders
fulfillod. In general,  investors  heeded  this advice  and  the success  rate in the fifth  round  (See  Table
C-5)  was  the highest  achieved  in the first wave.
There  were a number  of signs  that  the market  had cleared. Thirty-six  IPFs had
already  exhausted  all of their points  and  22 IPFs had  less  than 100  points  remaining.  Individual
investors  had 0.33 billion  points  left and  IPFs had  only 0.29 billion  remaining.  About  16%  of
Individual  investors  still had  the full 1000  points  to dispose  of, while  77% had  less  than  500 points
raemaining.  Only  39 companies  had more  than 80%  of their shares  still  unsold  at the start  ef the fifth
round.
The spread  between  the highest  and  lowest  price firms  was kept  the same  as in the
fourth  round. The theoretical  market  clearing  price  was 10.08/100  and  the actual  average  price at the
start  of bidding  was 6.78/100. At the completion  of the round,  the average  bidding  price was
8.46/100. Investors  appear  to have  focused  on bids  that were  likely  to result  in shares,  to avoid
having  worthless  points  at the end  of the final  bidding  round. Participation  rates  were  higher  than  in
previous  rounds  with  IPFs  using  virtually  all of their  remaining  points  and individual  Investors  using
82%  of their points.
By the end of the fifth  round,  92.8%  of all shares  had been  sold and  98.8%  of all
points  had been  used.  The proportion  of bids  that  resulted  in shares  was 86.5%  (compared  to 34.7%
in the fourth  round),  the  highest  achieved  in the first  wave. Forty  enterprises  were sold  by adjusting
the demand  of the IPFs downward.  The 1079  enterprises  for which  there  remained  unsold  shares
were  largely  privatized  and  the remaining  shares  will be held  by the National  Property  Fund. In the-50- 
cse  of the 117  enterpries for which  there was  excus demand  for shlmed,  the points  ftat were bid
became  invalid  and  the proprty returnd to the NPF, which  will  try to privatize  them  through  other
meua.  eto  divergence  of prices  betwoe enteprises in each  Republic  increased  in the fifth  round.
The avrage price of companies  located  in the Czech  Republic  remained  at 6.61/100,  while  the price
in the Slovak  Republic  fell fom 8.67/100  in the fourth  round  to 10.97/100  in the final  round. Thus
the avere  Slovak  firm sold  at a 40% discount  relative  to the average  Czech  firm in the coupon
scheme. This  reflected  the market's ssmoent  of the poorer  prospects  for Slovak  enterprises,  many
of which  wro otablished  artificilly during  the communist  era.
Table C-5:  Bidding  Dynunda  - Flfth Round
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  Tota!  shamesold/
Number  ham offered  sm  asorderd  hae  sold  total sae  offered
of  fir  ms  nmllion  (inc  millos  n)  an ot)
Exce  swpply  of  har  1079  S4.6  37.2  37.2  68.1
Small  excess  demand  40  3.7  3.9  3.7  100.0
Excea  demand  117  4.2  6.3  0.0  0.0
Total  1236  62.5  47.4  41.0  65.6
of which:
Czech  Republic  818  39.0  28.6  24.5  62.8
Slovak  Republic  418  23.5  18.8  16.5  70.2
A summary  of the results  of the first wave  of the coupon  scheme  in terms  of shares,
points  and  prices  is provided  in Tables  C-6  to C-8.-51 -
Table C46: Supply  and Dunand for Shame.
(mWllm  dama)
Bidding  Round
1  I  I  4  I 
Supply  of shua  299.4  210.0  132.1  99.6  62.5  -
nomand  for shaus  235.7  148.2  273.9  106.8  47.4  -
Dmnnd by IPPs  175.2  92.5  122.2  53.4  26.5  -
Derud  by Individuab  60.5  55.7  151.7  53.4  20.8  -
Total Sold  89.4  77.8  32.5  37.1  41.0  177.8
of which:
Czech  Rap.  68.0  S9.2  20.7  25.5  24.5  197.9
Slovak Rep.  21.4  18.6  11.8  11.6  16.S  79.9
Sold  to IPP  69.9  50.6  19.5  17.0  18.8  176.0
Czech  51.8  36.2  11.2  9.9  9.2  118.3
Slovak  18.1  14.4  8.4  7.:  9.6  57.7
Sold to Individuals  19.5  27.2  12.9  20.0  22.1  101.8
Czech  11.4  17.9  7.6  13.3  13.9  64.0
Slovak  8.1  9.3  5.3  6.7  A 3  37.8
Cumulative  sold  89.4  167.3  199.7  236.8  277.7  277.7
% of total sold  29.9%  S5.9%  66.7%  78.8%  92.8%  92.8%
Table C-I:  Voucber  Points  in rhat  Wave
(billion point.)
Bidding Round
.1  a  a 
Pomnts  available  8.54  5.57  2.14  1.13  0.62
Points  bid  7.86  4.88  1.99  1.00  O.S6
X of poinz bid  92%  88%  93%  89%  90%
Satisfied  demond  2.98  3.41  1.02  0.51  0.52
% of oni  satisfied  38%  70%  51%  51%  93%
Cum"uive  satisfied  2.98  6.39  7.41  7.92  8.44
%oftotal saisfied  35%  75%  87%  93%  99%- 52 -
Table C48: Enterprim Sold, Minimm and Maximum Prie.
Bidding  Round
1  2  2i
Number  of firma3°  1491  1443  1369  1317  1236
Sold  48  72  S1  80  40
Cumuliive  sold 3 "  48  120  171  251  291
M  _imumsham  price  3:100  10:100  97:100  60:100  60:100
Maximum Ar  price  3:100  1:400  1:800  1:1000  1:1000
Avrag  dare price  0.030  0.054  0.129  0.088  0.055
m:kzsch\privtd.tU- 53 -
1.  'Czechoslovakdia  or CSFR in this paper refers to the Federation  that existoe  between  the Czech and
Slovak  Republics  prior to January 1, 1993.
2.  Mejstrik, M. (1992),  The Czechodovak  Large Privatiztion," working paper number 11, Conter for
Economic  Research  and Graduate  Education, Charles University,  July, p. 2.
3.  The basic law enabling  small scale privatization  was LAw  number  427/1990  which took effect from
Decomber 1, 1990.  In the Czech  Republic, about 25,400 small scale units were auctioned. Th  total
openin,  g price for these units was Kcs. 25.1 billion  and total sals  revenues wore about Yca.  31.1
billio.  In Slovakia, about 10,000 units were auctioned,  one-third of which  were food siops.  TUh  total
starting price was Kcs 12.1 billion and the total auction revenues  amounted to Kcs 14.2 billion. On
avrage,  the selling price exceeded  the opening  price by 17  %.  For more detail on restitution
legislation, se  L Svitek, uRepriv5tzegon  in Czec1oslovakia, Rervatization  in Contral and,  Eaen
Eu  , Cental and Eastern European  Privatization  Network  and World Bank, 19.
4.  The basic law enabling  medium  and large scalo  privatination  is Law number 92/1991 which took effect
from June 1, 1991. Details of the coupon scheme  were elaborated  in Decree number 383/1991  which
took effect on September  5, 1991. This was followed  by one amendment  (decree number 69/1992)  and
the law establishing  a stock exchange  (Law number 214/19).  For a description  of the various
privatization  approaches  used, see Ceska, R. (1992) Czechoslovakia  - Czech  Republic Country
Privatiution Report,  '  paper presented at the annual conference  on privatization  in Central and Eastern
Europe, Ljubiana, Slovenia, Decomber,  1992.  For details  on logislation,  see E. Klracova and Jelinekl-
Francis,  Privatization  in Czechoslovakia  - 1991: Legislative  Requirements  and their Rwsults, and D.
Tffska, 'Political, Organizational  and Logislative  Aspects  of Mass Privatization  - Czechoslovalcia',
Privatization  in Central and Eastern Europe, Centrl  and Eastern European  Privatization  Network  and
World Bank, 1992.
5.  There were cases where existing amangement  signed long term rental arrangements  which effectively
determined  the future of the enterprise. This method  of de facto privatization  through rental
agreements  was made illegal  by the amendment  to the law on privatization  which addressed many
loopholes  in the legislation  that only became  apparent  after the process started.
6.  The only provision for preferential  treatment  of employees  was the possible  inclusion of a provision  to
buy up to 10% of the firm's equity  at book value using company  resources  in the context of a
privatization  proposal submitted  by management  or employees.
7.  The amendment  to the Law on Large Privatization  passed in February 1992 mr  de non-compliance  with
informational  requests legally  punishable.
8.  Shares set aside for restitution consisted  of an average of 5.4% of shares in 75 firms in the Czech
Republic  and an average of 1.1% of shares in 8 firms in the Slovak  Republic. Foreign investors  in the
Czech Republic  concentrated  on 41 enterprises  in which the foreign  investors share averaged  39%.  In
Slovakia, foreign investors  bought  half as many shares, which were even more concentrated  in 10
enterprises and also averaged 39% of the shares in these firms.  Domestic  direct investment  was
actually  more important  for enterprises  in the coupon scheme than foreign investment. In the Czech
Republic, domnestic  investors  bought  holdings that average 41 % of shares concentrated  in 90
entesprises. In Slovakia, domestic  investors  concentrated  on 31 enterprises  with holdings averaging
36%.  Temporary  holding  of shares by the National Property Fund (NPF) was far more important  in
the Czech Republic,  but there were relatively  more firms slated for permanent ownership  by the NPF
in Slovakia. Temporary  holding  by the NPF meant  that the shares were intended for eventual sale, but
possibly through some other privatization  method. Permanent  holdings  by the NPF were usually- 54  -
enterprises  where the state wanted to keep some controlling  interest or which could be sold at some
unspecified  future date.  In the Czech  Republic, 308 enterprises  had an average of 22 % of their shares
under the temporary ownership  of the NPF, while only 28 enterprises  had 8.5 % of their share allocated
for permanent holding  by the NPF.  In the Slovak  Republic,  only 50 firms with an average of 28 % of
their shares were slated for temporary  ownership  by the NPF, while 26 firms with 38  % of their shares
were slated for permanent  ownership  by the NPF.  Two other categories  of share1:olding  - by banks
and through transfers to municipalities  - were only used in the Czech Republic. Banks  consisted  of
holdings  averaging 25 % of total shares in 58 enterprises. Transfers  to municipalities  in the Czech
Republic  tended to be small holdings  of about 6  % in a total  of 182  enterprises.
9.  Sectoral averages in this table and throughout  the discussion  in this paper (unless otherwise  stated) are
calculated  for each individual  enterprise and then averaged  across the sector.  This results in equal
weighing  given to each enterprise. This provides  an indication  of the characteristics  of an 'average
enterprise' in a sector, which is more relevant for privatization. The alternative is to sum the debt, for
example, of all enterprises  and then divide it by the sum of the equity  in all enterprises  to derive an
average debt/equity  ratio.  This second approach,  however, gives a sectoral average as opposed to an
enterprAse  average and weights enterprises  by size.  More detailed  versions  of these tables  are provided
in Annex B.
10.  The original deadline of December 31, 1991 was extended  until January 31, 1992 to allow more
citizens to register, and then postponed again to February  28, 1992 in selected registration  centers.
11.  Each booklet contained  a series of coupons  denominated  in multiples  of 100  points which had to be
filled out with the identification  code of the bidder, the enterprises, and, where points are to be
managed  by a fund, the identification  code of the IPF.
12.  There was actually  one enterprise in the fourth bidding round  in which demand  exactly  equaled the
supply of shares.
13.  See Annex C for detailed analysis of each of the biddin:z  rounds.  All the data on bidding  rounds results
are from the Center for Coupon Privatization.
14.  The data on IPFs by size is still tentative  and should  be interpreted  with caution.
15.  Size of enterprise is defined as:  small (book value under Kcs 100,000,000), medium  (book  value more
than Kcs 100,000,000  and less than 500, 000,000), and large (book value greater than Kcs
500,000,000).
16.  Size of IPF is defined as:  small (shares less than 100,000),  medium (shares greater than 100,000  and
less than 1,000,000)  and large (shares greater than 1,000,000).
17.  One of the biggest puzzles of the coupon scheme  has been the popularity of commercial  banks shares,
despite widespread  knowledge  of the poor quality  of bank portfolios. A number of explanation  exist.
First, that the major commercial  banks were 'too big to fail" and that ultimately  the government  would
bail them out.  A second and related explanation  is that individual  citizens trust banks and saw them as
safe but profitable investments. Thirdly, the fact that many of the major IPFs were owned by the
banks may have affected bidding behavior, although  the funds are technically  independent  of bank
operations. While fund managers may have inside information  on the likely future profitability  of the
bank that owns them, they may also be subject  to pressures from bank management.- 55  -
18.  heo  work  of GaW, Jones,  Tandon  and Vogesang  (1992)  is one of the few  systatic  aempts to
quantify  the  couaequmnces  of privatiztion  at the  enterprise  level. See A. Gaal, L. Jones,  P. Tandon
and J. Vogesand  (1992),  'Welfsr Consequences  of Sdling Public  Enterprises:  Cas Studies  from
Chilo,  Malaysia,  Mexico  and the UK', World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C, June.
19.  Tho inrtituro  for the coupon  privatzation  schome  will  provide  tho  buis for the now  Center  for
Securities,  which  will  become  the basis  for stock  market  trading. The Center  for Securities  expects
about  6 million  accounts  for individual  shareholders,  2400  accounts  for issuers  of shar,  and 440
accounts  for invesment  funds  in the  now  stock  nmrket.
20.  See World  Banc  (1992),  p. 24 for examples.
21.  It is inteeting to copar  tho fisal conquences  of the owpon  schm  with thos of sadard
privatition  methods.  Pivaditon  though auctions  of a11  small-scale  enteprise genrto  about  Ko
31.1 billion  in the Czech  Republic  and KCC  14.2  billion  in the Slovak  Republic  a  of the end of 1992.
These  revenues  from  sma  scalo  privataion  have  been  set aside  to finance  the  privatzaon of medical
facilities  in the  second  wave. In 1992,  revenues  from sles of medium  and large  scalo  enteprise using
standard  methods  wero  Ks 26.8  billion  in the Czech  Republic  and wero  Kcs.  6.7 billion  in the  Slovak
Republic. In tho  Czech  Republic,  enterprses  on average  sold  at close  to their  book  value  during  the
firt wave. Direct  sales  in the Slovak  Republic  wro at a price  that  averaged  1.2  times  book  value,
although  this was  for a smller ample of firms. In contrast,  book  value  was  not a good  indicator  of
the final  slling prico  in the  coupon  shesin  Czechoslovakia,  nor in the cases  of direct  sales  in other
tansition cononmies,  such s Hungary,  whore  direct  sales tended  to be at prices  below  book  value.
To  explanation  may  lie in the  higher  averge quality  of firms  privatized  through  direct  sae in
Czechoslovadia,  where  the  coupon  scheme  was  available  for privatizing  firma  of low or unknown
Value.
22.  A list of S2S locally  managed  firms  was  published  on August  24 1992  with a deadline  for submission
of privatization  projects  of October  24, 1992. A list  of 5SO  locally  managed  medical  facilities  was
published  separately  with  a deadline  for submissions  of October  31, 1992. Ceska  (1992).
23.  For data  on outcomes  in terms  of privatiztion  methods  in the fist wave,  see Ceska  (1992)  p. 26.
24.  Mejstrik  (1992),  p. 20.
25.  Ceska  (1992),  p. 20.
26.  The following  information  was  required  for a privatization  project:  (1) enterprise  name  and  property  for
privatization;  (2) information  on how  the state  acquired  the  property  to be privatized;  (3) identification
of the property  unusable  for business  purposes  (debts,  unusable  fixed  assets  and stocks);  (4) valuation
(usually  book  value  except  where  foreign  investors  are involved  when  a market  valuation  is required);
(5) Method  for transferring  the property  including  settlement  of outstanding  claims;  (6) definition  of
legal  status  in cases  of commercial  compsaies;  (7) in cases  of joint stock  companies,  the  distribution  of
shares,  their  value  or type;  whether  and  how  investment  coupons  will  be used;  (8) if local property  is
to be sold, the location  nd method  of sales,  pricing  and the conditions  and terms  of payment;  (9) in
some  cases,  the proportion  of the privatixtion  proceeds  to be turned  over to the  National  Property
Funds  of the Republics;  (10) transfer  of intellectual  property  rights,  which  must  be discussed  in
advance  with the  Fedeal Bureau  of Invendons;  (11)  project  implemnntation  schedule;  (12)  In cases  of
direct ale,  unpaid trmsfer, or c  i  zaton,  the privatization  project should also contain a
business  plan  and recom  io  concering the object  of business  activities,  information  on
potential  buyers  or investon,  information  on the existing  and anticipated  marcet  position  of the
enterprise,  and information  on the number  and skills  of the enterprise's  work  force  (p. 6).-56-
27.  Baod on dla in Mojtrik (1992),  p. 12.
28.  In cases  wor  wa  oveubscribe  in one round  and undermbscribed  in aother, the  pricing
rule ws  mo  complicated.  For ent  me  that  experieced exes  demand  in round mne  but excess
supply  in the second  round,  two  catgories wr  defined:  (1) whero  exces demand  in round  ooo  wa
greter than  tbreefold,  the  prices  in round  two wero  not changed;  and (2)  whore  the exces demand  in
round 1 wa less than  trefold,  pnces were lowered  after  round  two  basod  on the  degroo  of rWivo
demand.  e ame nle wa applied  to enteprios tat  wero  undersbscribod  in round  one  and
overubscribed  in round  two  bsed on the  doere of rlative dmand in round  two. For entaprime
weless  tI a  11,000  sue  remainod,  prcie wre either  not adjusted  or adjustd slihtly bsed co
rtive  domand  in round  two  and the number  of shares  rmaining. In some  cases  rounding  wu
required  to inure tht points  tequi  we  always  denominated  in multiple  of 100.
29.  MIjsrik, M. (1992)  'Privatinz  Newsletter  of Czechoslovakia,  Ceoter  for Economic  Resrch  d
Graduate  Education  at Cales  University,  number  11, Dcember.
30.  Four  firms  weao  dropped  from  the  voucher  scheme  over the  course  of the rounds  for reasons  uch  a
new information  on the  valuation  of the firzL
31.  ITh figus  only reflct entprima for which  aU  sae  on offer  wor sold. However,  bocwe da
in u  s  ibd  fwis weo fulfillod,  the majority  of share in the 1079  enterprises  with  shar  in
excm supply  by the fifth  bidding  round  we  privatized.  Only  those  117  enterprises  chutized  by
exces demand  woe left  unsold  by the end  of the last round.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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